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THE ENCYCLOPAEDISTS.
BY PROFESSOR L. L^VY-BRUHL.
VOLTAIRE was, indeed, in his tendencies, both confessed and
secret, in his likes and his dislikes, in his good qualities and
his defects, "the representative man of French philosophy in the
eighteenth century." We have therefore been obliged to give a
somewhat detailed account of his doctrines, in which we find the
average of the philosophical ideas professed by most of his con-
temporaries. Around him was arrayed an army of "philosophers,"
full of zeal but undisciplined, and sometimes unruly, whose best
lieutenants were the most independent. In spite, however, of the
differences in their natures, tempers, aptitudes and talents, the
public feeling was not mistaken in grouping them all together un-
der one name, from La Mettrie to Condorcet, from Condillac to
Abb^ Raynal. Sometimes unthinkingly, but in most cases quite
consciously, they worked together on a common task. Most of
them used every exertion in combating the Roman Catholic
Church, and in a general way Christianity itself. They rejected its
conception of the universe and of man, which appeared to them
false and superstitious; they condemned the social order which
the Catholic hierarchy contributed to maintain, and which they
thought unjust and oppressive. Against this double tyranny all
weapons were lawful. They would preserve nothing of this reli-
gion except its moral teaching, and even this they reduced to its
essential elements, and held it to be human rather than specifically
Christian.
In the constructive part of their work likewise, in spite of in-
evitable divergencies, they are quite akin to one another. Eager
to lose no time in putting something in the place of that which they
I30 THE OPEN COURT.
thought they had destroyed, they set to work with great haste, and
their want of experience appears so constantly as to be almost mo-
notonous. There is a continual recurrence of the same paradoxes,
accepted without discussion, and of the same dubious formulae
looked upon as axioms ; their common stock consisted of a limited
number of theories, often superficial and rudimentary, concern-
VOLTAIRE.
From a painting by Latour in 1736. Engraved by Balecbou.
ing psychology, morals, politics and history, and of certain ideas
and views which were often both profound and fruitful—building-
stones, as it were, intended to fit into an edifice which they were
as yet unable to build. For the Encyclopcedia which they thought
of as destined to be this edifice, represents a work-yard rather than
a building. It has no unity, save in the spirit which animates it,
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and in the perseverance of Diderot, who, in spite of obstacles and
at the cost of untold trouble and sacrifice, finally brought it to com-
pletion.
* *
La Mettrie, by the date of his works, somewhat precedes the
main body of the philosophical army. He died in 1751, four years
Voltaire in His Library.
before Montesquieu, and before Diderot, D'Alembert and Rous-
seau had produced their masterpieces. Being a disciple of Boer-
haave, who sought to explain the phenomena of life by the mech-
anism of physical and chemical phenomena, being also acquainted,
though somewhat superficially, with the doctrines of Descartes and
Locke, he composed, with elements derived from widely different
sources, a system which he thought scientifically proven. It was a
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kind of materialism, based on the idea which often reappeared in
the course of the century, that the diversity in the orders of phe-
nomena is due to the more or less complex organisation of matter.
As this organisation is not the same in animals as in plants, nor
(in certain points ) in man as in animals, the functions which exist
in plants, animals, and in man, must also be different : there is no
need whatever of a special principle to explain certain of these
functions rather than others. In opposition to spiritualistic dual-
ism, which sets an abyss between the substance of the soul and
that of the body, La Mettrie advanced, in his Histoire Naturelle de
rAme, the ancient peripatetic and scholastic conception, which
makes of the soul the form of the body. Like some Aristoteli-
ans of the Renaissance, he slipped his own materialism into this
theory. He openly expounded it in the Ho7time-Machine. While
he praised Descartes for saying that an animal is a machine, he re-
proached him for not having dared to say the same of man. Not
that La Mettrie denied the existence of feeling or thought in
animals or in man : such a paradox would seem to him absurd.
He means that feeling, thought, consciousness, are all produced
by the machine ; the whole soul is explained by it, depends upon
it, and, in consequence, disappears when it gets out of order, or is
taken apart. As a physician, he quotes in support of his theory
definite facts borrowed from mental physiology and pathology, and
he declares that he will accept as his judges none but scientific
men, acquainted with anatomy and with the philosophy of the
body.
La Mettrie's reputation in the eighteenth century was very
bad. In our days some have tried to rehabilitate him. No doubt
a philosopher may have been a declared materialist and atheist,
have written insipid defences of physical voluptuousness, and have
died from eating too freely of patties, and yet may none the less
have been a sincere man and have honestly sought after truth. No
doubt also La Mettrie more than once served as a scapegoat for
the philosophers who followed him and perhaps from time to time
imitated him. The nearer they came to him the more fiercely they
expressed their indignation against his abominable doctrines; for
he, being dead, had nothing to fear either from the police or the
Parliament. His good name may have suffered from this manoeu-
ver. Yet, if we examine his works closely, we shall conclude that
he has not been seriously wronged. He does not sufficiently dis-
tinguish between what is proved and what is merely asserted ; he
has no absorbing concern for close reasoning and exact expression,
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and his language is often rash in proportion to the looseness of his
demonstrations. Let us grant that he introduced French material-
ism in the eighteenth century, but let us acknowledge at the same
time that he too often presented it under an aggressive and unac-
ceptable form.
Frontispiece TO the " Encyclop.edia,
In 1 75 1 appeared 'Cixo. Discoiirs Pre'liminaire oi \\\& EncyclopcB-
dia. Diderot had acted wisely in asking D'Alembert to write it,
and in contenting himself with drawing up the prospectus of his
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great enterprise. He had already been at odds with the authori-
ties, and had spent several months in Vincennes on account of his
Lettre sin- les Aveugles, in a word, he was looked upon as a sus-
picious character. D'Alembert, a great mathematician, renowned
for his Traite de Dynamique, and a member of the Academy of Sci-
ence, was just the man to present the Encyclopcedia to the public,
and his name insured it against the ill-will of the enemies of phi-
losophy.
This discourse was much admired, but we now find it rather
difficult to understand this admiration. Though we do not refuse
our homage to the dignity of its tone and the elevation of its
thought, we are rather disappointed as we read it. This is owing
to several causes. Ideas which were new in those days have now
become familiar and commonplace. Several important points in
D'Alembert's philosophy do not appear in the Discoiirs, or are
merely hinted at. Others, on the contrary, are developed which
do not express his real thought; but he believed this concession to
be indispensable in order to gain acceptance for the rest. "In the
accursed country in which we write," he said to Voltaire, "such
phrases as these are notarial style, and serve only as passports for
the truths that we wish to establish. Moreover, nobody is deceived
by them Time will teach men to distinguish what we have
thought from what we have said." D'Alembert never would devi-
ate from this prudent course. Accordingly we see in the works
offered to the public a D'Alembert whose attitude is irreproach-
able and whose irony is hidden under the forms of respect. But
the letters to Voltaire and to Frederic the Great show us a quite
different sort of man, eager for the fray, and as much incensed
against parliaments, Jesuits, Jansenists, priests in general, and reli-
gion as the most determined "philosopher."
Being a fervent admirer of Bacon, D'Alembert borrowed from
him his classification of sciences, with a few alterations which he
himself explains. To tell the truth, the Discours Prdiminaire con-
tains not one but three classifications of human knowledge, from
three different points of view. D'Alembert first examines "the
origin and development of our ideas and sciences from the philo-
sophical or metaphysical (i. e., psychological) point of view."
Like a true disciple of Locke and Condillac, he divides all our
knowledge into direct ideas and ideas derived from reflexion. Our
direct knowledge is only that which has come to us through our
senses : in other words, to our sensations alone do we owe our
ideas. The classification here consists, therefore, in tracing our
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complex ideas back to simple ones, that is, to those derived from
sensation.
The "encyclopaedic order of sciences," which comes next, is
a logical order. It must not be confused with the order which the
human mind has actually followed in the production of the sciences.
In all likelihood man, spurred on by his bodily wants, must first have
set out to meet the most urgent need, and then, as he met with diffi-
culties, have tried another way, then have retraced his steps, etc.
If so, the sciences which we look upon as containing the principles
of all others, and which must come first in the encyclopaedic order,
were not the first to be invented. Moreover, in the historical order
of the progress of the human mind, the various sciences can be
viewed only in succession, one after another, whereas the encyclo-
paedic order consists in embracing all sciences at one glance, as if
from a height one should perceive at one's feet a maze of inter-
weaving paths. Or, again, this encyclopaedic order may be com-
pared to a map of the world, on which we see at one glance the
whole surface of the globe. And just as, in preparing such a map,
we may choose among various systems of projection, so we may
also conceive the encyclopaedic order in several different ways.
None of these ways is necessarily to be adopted to the exclusion
of all others, and if D'Alembert chose that of Bacon it was because,
without being more defective than the others, it has the advantage
of suggesting with tolerable accuracy the genealogy of human
knowledge.
Lastly, a third order considered by D'Alembert is that accord-
ing to which our sciences have been historically developed since the
Renaissance. It differs from the order which the human mind would
follow if left to its own lights. In this order, then, the sciences of
erudition came first, owing to the prestige of antiquity, which after
long ages of barbarism and ignorance was rising again fair and
luminous before the delighted eyes of men. Thus D'Alembert had
a clear perception of the psychological genesis of our knowledge,
of the logical order of the sciences, and of their historical succes-
sion. Could not these three orders have been combined to form a
higher one? Comte later on attempted such a combination; but
D'Alembert contented himself with a rapid criticism of each of the
sciences, and a summary appreciation of the great minds who had
created or developed them.
And, first of all, in the already formidable mass of our knowl-
edge, how few branches deserve the name of sciences ! History,
according to D'Alembert, is in no wise entitled to it. It is only of
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practical interest. Why should we not, for instance, cull from it
the best catechism of morals that could be given to children, by
collecting into one book the really memorable deeds and words ?
It would be particularly useful to philosophers and to the "unfor-
tunate class " of princes to teach them to know the men with whom
they live from what they learn of men who lived in former times.
Metaphysics should be strictly limited to what is treated of in
Locke's Essay. Nearly all the other questions it proposes to solve
are either beyond solution or idle. It is the food of rash or ill-
balanced minds—in one word, a vain and contentious science.
D'Alembert is not allured, like Voltaire, by the hypothesis which
attributes to matter, under certain conditions, the power to think.
To him it appears uncalled for and dangerous. If it inclines
towards materialism, we fall back into a metaphysical doctrine no
more clearly proven than any other. Is it not better for us to con-
fess that we do not know at all what substance, soul, and matter,
are? Likewise, as regards the existence and nature of God, scep-
ticism is the only reasonable attitude of mind. And we should be
compelled to say the same of the existence of the outer world and
of man's liberty, did not instinct here supplement the deficiency of
reason ; whether the outer world exists or not, we have such a
strong inclination to believe in it that everything appears to us as
if it existed ; and, in the same way, everything appears to us as if
we were free.
Even in the natural sciences, how limited did man's knowl-
edge appear. Physiology had hardly yet begun to exist. D'Alem-
bert speaks of medicine as a man who has measured all its risks;
in his eyes it is a purely empirical science. The physician who
builds systems and clings to a theory is most dangerous ; that one
is least to be feared who has seen many patients and has learned
to make an accurate diagnosis and not to dose at random. Physics
is more advanced and its conquests are lasting. Here we stand on
firmer ground, but progress is slow and the human mind has to
guard against itself. D'Alembert insists upon the prudent advice
already given by Bacon : we should distrust even the most proba-
ble explanations, so long as they have not been tested by experi-
ence, and, if possible, by calculation.
Sciences in the highest sense of the word, D'Alembert called
those he had been studying all his lifetime, and to which he
owed the best of his glory—the mathematical sciences, which he
divides into pure mathematics, mixed mathematics, and physico-
mathematical sciences. Certitude, properly so called, which is
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founded upon principles necessarily true and self-evident, does not
belong equally or in the same way to all these branches of mathe-
matics. Those which rest on physical principles, that is, on ex-
perimental truths or on physical hypotheses, have, so to speak,
only an experimental or hypothetical certitude.
One might infer from this that D'Alembert looks upon pure
mathematics, in opposition to physico-mathematical sciences, as
being really « /r/Vr/ and independent of experience : but how could
he have harmonised such a conception with the principle borrowed
from Locke, according to which all our knowledge comes, either
directly or indirectly, from experience ? D'Alembert did not fall
into this contradiction. He avoided it by means of a theory of
mathematics which was consistent with his sensationalistic princi-
ples, and much clearer than the ones to which Hume and Condil-
lac resorted. Mathematics, in his opinion, belongs to natural
philosophy. "The science of dimensions in general is the remot-
est term to which the contemplation of the properties of matter
may lead us." Experience shows us individual beings and partic-
ular phenomena, the sun, the moon, rain, and wind. By means of
successive abstractions and of more and more comprehensive gen-
eralisations, we separate the qualities common to all these phenom-
ena and beings, till at last we reach the fundamental properties of
all bodies : impenetrability, extension, and size. We cannot further
subdivide our perceptions, and we find at this point a subject for
sciences which, in virtue of the simplicity of this subject, may be
made deductive. Thus, in geometry, we strip matter of nearly all
its material qualities, and consider, so to speak, only its ghost.
" Thus," says D'Alembert in a language that foreshadows Stuart
Mill, "it is merely by a process of abstraction that the geometri-
cian considers lines as having no breadth, and surfaces as having
no thickness. The truths he demonstrates about the properties of
all zxQ purely hypothetical truths. But they are none the less use-
ful, considering the consequences that result from them." This
empirical theory of mathematics, which stands in such direct op-
position to that of Plato and Descartes, has made its appearance
again in our century, and is anything but abandoned at the pres-
ent day. Even such men as Helmholtz, though reared under the
influence of Kant, have deemed it indispensable to accept the
statement that geometry contains elements derived from experi-
ence.
As the certainty of mathematics rests on the evidence of ideas
so closely related that the mind perceives the connexion between
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them at a glance, so the certainty of morals rests on the "heart's
evidence " which rules us as imperiously. D'Alembert's theory of
morals is almost entirely identical with Voltaire's. The only orig-
inal feature about it is the personal accent that D'Alembert gives
it, especially in his letters. To him sympathy for the hapless, in-
dignation against the "monstrous inequality of fortunes" are not
mere commonplaces, hackneyed expressions of a trite sentimental-
ity, an homage paid to the reigning fashion. They are the words
of a man who has seen the poor, who has lived among them, who
has witnessed their sufferings, and to whom misery is a living real-
ity, not a theme for literary amplification. D'Alembert goes so far
as to ask himself whether, when driven to despair, and reduced
without fault of his own to the verge of starvation, a man is mor-
ally bound to respect the surplus that another has beyond his
needs.
In dignity of life and independence of character, as well as in
genius, D'Alembert was among the glories of the party of philoso-
phers. He more than once dared to contradict Voltaire. His
friendship with Frederick never cost any sacrifice of his pride, and
he fell out with Catherine of Russia because she rather haughtily
rejected his intercession on behalf of some Frenchmen who had
been taken prisoners in Poland. His two great passions were for
mathematics and against "priests"; and it is characteristic of the
times that the latter should have contributed no less than the for-
mer to constitute him a "philosopher."
*
* *
Diderot was as adventurous, expansive and lyrical as D'Alem-
bert was prudent, reserved and methodical. But his disorder is
rich in ideas. Diderot was one of the most extraordinary mind-
stirring writers that the world has ever seen. The brightness and
charm of his conversation seem to have been prodigious. He was
called "the philosopher." It must indeed be admitted that if we
always meant by this word a man whose methodical and persever-
ing meditation does not rest satisfied till it has found out a first
principle from which it can deduce the whole world of reality, Di-
derot would occupy but a low place among philosophers. Not that
he was incapable of reducing his ideas to a system ; but the start-
ing-point of his attempts at such a synthesis was variable, depend-
ing on a chance encounter, conversation or reading. Before his
reason went deep into things, his imagination had to be stirred.
But on the other hand he was without a rival in rising from an ap-
parently insignificant point to general ruling principles, and in dis-
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covering from that vantage ground many roads, some of which led
him to new points of view ; his curiosity was indefatigable, his re-
flexion sometimes profound and always suggestive.
Unfortunately, though all this be sufficient to exercise a con-
siderable influence upon contemporaries, it may easily fail to pro-
duce many durable works. All Diderot's writings wear an air of
improvisation, due to his ready and sudden enthusiasm, and to the
facility with which he could put together extempore a vast structure
of ideas. It can therefore hardly be said that the Encyclopcedia,
by compelling him to scatter his labors for twenty years upon an
infinite and varied task, prevented him from bringing forth the
great masterpiece which his intelligence, if concentrated, might
have produced. It was rather because Diderot felt no strong de-
sire to concentrate himself thus that he poured into the Encyclo-
pcedia and into a multitude of pamphlets his wonderful gifts for
quick assimilation and uninterrupted, but fragmentary, production.
Diderot was at first a deist, after the manner of Voltaire, and,
like him, under the influence of the English, particularly of Locke
and Shaftesbury. He then thought, as did Voltaire, that modern
physics had dealt materialism and scepticism a fatal blow. "The
discovery of germs, in itself, has dispelled one of the strongest ob-
jections of atheism." But this style of philosophy soon ceased to
satisfy him, and he gradually inclined to what he himself called the
most attractive form of materialism : that which attributes to or-
ganic molecules desires, aversions, feeling, and thought,—to end
at last in a sort of pantheistic naturalism.
Several paths led Diderot to this goal. First of all, he per-
ceived that the irreducible dualism of soul and body was generally
upheld for religious quite as much as for philosophical reasons
;
and this alone was sufficient to drive him away from it. Then, in
his Lettres sur les Aveugles and Siir les Sourds Afueis, he insists
upon the relative character of our metaphysical conceptions. For
a blind man, what becomes of the proof of the existence of God
based upon final causes? Diderot attempted, as Condillac did
afterwards, to work out the psychological development of sensa-
tionalism. All our knowledge comes from the senses; how does it
come from them? What do we owe to each of our senses? Can
we analyse their data, and afterward from them reconstruct the
whole ? Cheselden's experiment and Molyneux's problem were
known; Diderot wished to go beyond these, to carry this kind of
"metaphysical anatomy" still farther, and to take in pieces, so to
speak, the senses of man. He imagined the "conventional mute,"
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and the conclusions that he drew from his psychological analysis
alarmed many a Christian.
But Diderot's pantheistic tendencies seem to have been chiefly
determined by the discoveries made about this time in natural sci-
ence. These he followed with passionate interest, and his imagi-
nation soon swept him on to bold hypotheses concerning life and
thought. "We are," he says, "on the verge of a great revolution
in science." In mathematics such men as Bernoulli, Euler,
D'Alembert, Lagrange, have "set the pillars of Hercules." Nobody
will go further. The natural sciences, on the other hand, have
only just been born ; and already the little that is known about
them entirely changes our view of the world. For instance, to a
mathematician studying abstract mechanics, a body may undoubt-
edly, by convention, be looked upon as inert ; but if we examine
the facts, the inertia of bodies is a "fearful error," contrary to all
sound principles of physics and chemistry. In itself, whether we
consider its particles or its mass, a body is full of activity and
strength. The distinction between inorganic and living matter is
therefore superficial, and strictly speaking even false ; for do we
not plainly see that the same matter is alternately living and not
living, according as it is assimilated or eliminated by a plant or an
animal? Nature makes flesh with marble, and marble with flesh.
Therefore, is it not very rash to assert that sensibility is incompat-
ible with matter, since we do not know the essence of anything
whatever, either of matter or of sensibility? But, it is said, sen-
sibility is a simple quality, one and indivisible, and incompatible
with a divisible subject. " Metaphysico-theological gibberish,"
answers Diderot. Experience shows that life is everywhere; who
knows but feeling may be everywhere too?
One of the most serious objections raised against such a doc-
trine rests on the stability and permanence of living species, which
seem to set an insurmountable barrier between man and other an-
imals, between any two living species, and, above all, between the
realm of life and that of inorganic matter. Diderot was aware of
this difficulty. He answered it by asserting the natural evolution
of all the species that ever appeared on the globe. It does not fol-
low because of the present state of the earth and consequently of
the living species and of the inanimate bodies which are to be
found thereon, that this state has always been similar in the past,
or is to remain similar in the future. What we mistake for the
history of nature is only the history of an instant of time. Just as
in the animal or vegetable kingdom an individual begins to exist.
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grows, matures, decays, and disappears, may it not be the same
with an entire species ? Who knows what races of animals have
preceded us? And who knows what races of animals will succeed
ours? Let us then waive the apparently unanswerable question
of the origin of life. If you are puzzled by the question of the egg
and the owl, it is because you suppose animals to have been orig-
inally what they are now. What folly ! We do not know what
they have been any more than we know what they are to be. To
Diderot's eager, universal, and insatiable scientific curiosity was
joined a conception of science itself which might already be
termed "positivism." We know little ; let us be contented with
what we can know. Our means of gaining knowledge reach as far
as our real needs do, and where these means are denied us, knowl-
edge is probably not very necessary for us. I might as well feel
seriously grieved at not having four eyes, four feet, and two
wings. We must accept the fact that we are as we are, and not
aspire to a science that would be beyond our comprehension. If
men were wise, they would at last give their attention to investi-
gations that would promise to promote their comfort, and no longer
deign to answer questions which are idle because they are unan-
swerable. For a similar reason, they would cease to aim at a
greater degree of precision in science than practical considerations
demand. In a word, "utility is the measure of everything." Util-
ity will a few centuries hence set limits to experimental physics,
as it is on the point of doing with regard to geometry. " 1 will
allow centuries to this study (physics), because its sphere of utility
is infinitely wider than that of any other abstract science, and be-
cause it is unquestionably the basis of our real knowledge."
The same fervent love of humanity which animates and limits
Diderot's idea of science, is also to be found in his polemics
against the Christian religion. Of course his language varied ac-
cording to circumstances. When he did not intend to publish he
gave free rein to his bold tongue. In this way he wrote the Sup-
plement au Voyage de Bon Gainville, Le Neveu de Rameau (his master-
piece), the Entreiien avec la Marechale ^/^ * * * In private letters, he
sometimes vents his rage in invectives against that religion, "the
most absurd and atrocious in its dogmas, the most unintelligible,
metaphysical and intricate, and consequently the most liable to
divisions, schisms and heresies, the most fatal to public peace and
to sovereigns, the most insipid, the most gloomy, the most Gothic,
the most puerile, the most unsociable in its morals, the most intol-
erant of all." In the Encyclopcedia he makes a show of respect.
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Yet significant sallies will sometimes escape him : "The Hebrews
knew what Christians term the true God ; as if there were any
false one ! "
His ethics, extremely lax as regards the union of the sexes, is
unfortunately influenced by the lachrymose sentimentality of the
times. The moment tliat virtue is mentioned Diderot gets ex-
cited. Tears come into his eyes, his heart throbs, he gasps, he
must embrace his friends, and they must share his transports.
This overflow of feeling seriously impairs the precision of his
ideas. Diderot taught his daughter that every virtue has two re-
wards : the pleasure of doing good, and that of winning the good
will of others ; and every vice has two punishments : one in our
inmost hearts, the other in the feeling of aversion which we never
fail to excite in others. He wished her to have no prejudices, but
to have morals and principles ''common to all centuries and na-
tions." Here we recognise ideas dear to Voltaire. Like him also,
Diderot considered that justice was rooted in the very nature of
man, and not, in spite of Locke, variable according to times and
places. "The maxims engraved, so to speak, on the tables of
mankind are as ancient as man and preceded his laws for which
they ought to furnish the guiding principles." But Diderot, in ac-
cord here with Rousseau, added that nature has not created us
wicked, and that it is bad education, bad examples, and bad legis-
lation that deprave us.
The originality of Diderot must not therefore be sought in his
ethics; it lies elsewhere, in the mass of ideas set in motion by this
indefatigable mind, a real precursor on many points of the pres-
ent century, which has justly shown a predilection for him. He
anticipates the progress of the natural sciences and the change
they were to bring to the general conception of the universe, and
consequently to the whole life of mankind. He was among the first
to recognise the social importance of the mechanic arts, by giv-
ing them the place they were entitled to in the Encyclopedia. He
raised in public esteem the men who practise these arts, and thus
did for the workman what the physiocrats were at the same time
doing for the husbandman. At the same time his Salons were
making the beginnings of art criticism, and teaching his contempo-
raries how to look at pictures and statues. On dramatic art and
the art of the comedian he brought forward many ingenious and
profound ideas,—and finally, he revealed in many articles of the
Encyclopedia, a searching knowledge of the history of philosophy,
then neglected and almost unknown in France.
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Goethe, who greatly admired him, said that his was "the
most Germanic of French heads." Indeed very few French phi-
losophers have had as keen a sense of the great pulse of universal
life and of the creative power of nature, or as sound and penetrat-
ing an insight into manifold reality. He occupies a special place,
which we must almost despair of defining in a satisfactory man-
ner. We can neither set forth his philosophical thoughts without
exhibiting their shortcomings, nor ) et point out these drawbacks
without running the risk of being unjust to this vast, powerful, and
unrestrained genius.
* *
Compared with such men as D'Alembert and Diderot, Helve-
tius is not the most original of the " philosophers," yet his book
De VEsprit created a wonderful sensation, both in France and
abroad. This success was partly due, at least in France, to the
personality of the author, who was a great financier and a kind,
generous, hospitable and friendly man, who approached very near
to the most esteemed type of man of the eighteenth century: the
man of feeling who is virtuous and made happy by his virtue. The
success was undoubtedly also due in part to a most captivating
style ; easy to read, composed with a manifest concern for the
favor of women, and weaving in short stories and anecdotes, De
VEsprit did not repel even the most indolent reader. Lastly, its
success was due to the apparent boldness of the paradoxes which
however were nothing but the fashionable opinions carried to their
logical conclusions. The strange thing was that the success of
Helvetius lasted for a long time, and at the end of the century it
was still thought worth while to refute him.
Apart from the current doctrine of sensationalism for which
Helvetius was evidently indebted to Condillac or to some other
contemporary writer, his two main paradoxes are the following:
(i) That personal interest or the pursuit of happiness is the only
principle, whether confessed or not, of human actions; (2) that
education can do everything. The first paradox was not new.
Many a moralist, not to mention La Rochefoucauld, had already
shown the infinite cunning of self-love, and concluded that men,
even in the actions that seem most disinterested actions, are al-
ways more or less hypocritical. But Helvetius gives his argument
a quite different turn. There is no pessimism or bitterness about
him ; he is full of kindness. " It was not the love of paradoxes,"
he writes, "that led me to my conclusion, but solely a desire for
men's happiness." And he flatters himself that his doctrine may
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contribute to it. Indeed, if it be once granted that man never
seeks anything but his own interest, let law-givers so contrive that
the general interest shall always agree with private interests, and
all men will be good and happy. Everything, therefore, depends
upon the laws. Wherever private interest is identified with public
interest, virtue in each individual becomes the necessary effect of
Helvetius. (1715-1771.)
self-love and personal interest. ''All the vices of a nation almost
invariably originate in some defects of its legislation."
Diderot justly observed that this omnipotence attributed to
the laws repeats in an exaggerated form the conception of Mon-
tesquieu who saw an inseparable connexion between morals and
the system of government, and thus attributed to political laws an
influence not always confirmed by experience. Furthermore, with
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Montesquieu, the forms of government depend, in their turn, upon
climate and a multitude of conditions, whereas Helvetius expressly
opposes Montesquieu's theory of climates. He maintains that the
action of the law-giver is supreme everywhere, and that no obsta-
cles are insuperable if this action be properly directed. If it be ob-
jected that the pursuit of personal interest is rather a narrow basis
to sustain the whole edifice of human society, he answers that, as
all things come from experience, the feeling which was afterwards
to be called altruism is no exception to the rule. The moral in-
stinct, the moral sense, the natural capacity for beneficence and be-
nevolence, appealed to by the English, are not to be admitted.
"The vaunted system of the morally beautiful is really nothing but
the system of innate ideas, demolished by Locke, and brought for-
ward again under a somewhat different form." No individual is
born good, no individual is born wicked. Both goodness and wick-
edness are accidents, being the result of good or bad laws.
Thence logically follows the second paradox, according to
which education alone creates differences among men. Since noth-
ing is innate or hereditary, every human soul is at first a blank
page, and all souls are identical at birth. Inequality among minds
is therefore due to the various circumstances in which men have
been placed, to the passions aroused by these circumstances, to
the power of attention that these passions produce, in short, to a
thousand causes, but above all to education. Pedagogy is to in-
dividuals what political science is to nations. Error is an evil
which, like vice, may be avoided. To insure the happiness of
mankind, it will only be necessary to bring the art of education to
perfection. Education will make enlightened men and even "men
of genius as numerous as they have hitherto been scarce." The
enormity of the paradox did not prevent its making an impression
upon the public. It had at least the merit of calling attention to
the then quite new science of pedagogy, and of preparing the pub-
lic to welcome Rousseau's Ejnile. Besides, the influence of Rous-
seau was already quite perceptible in Helvetius. "Everything is
acquired " is indeed, according to Locke's conception, the nega-
tion of innate ideas; but it is also, according to Rousseau's con-
ception, the assertion that the errors, sufferings and crimes of
men are their own work, and that it is for the educator and the
law-giver to cure them.
Le Sysieme de la Nature, by Baron D'Holbach, which appeared
in 1770, is a less superficial and more vigorous work than the writ-
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ings of Helvetius. Being a confessed materialist, D'Holbach de-
fines man as a material being organised so as to feel, think
and be modified in certain ways peculiar to himself, that is, to
the particular combinations of substances of which he is com
posed. The intellectual faculties may be reduced to changes pro-
duced by motion in the brain. The word "spirit" has no mean-
ing. The savages admit the existence of ''spirits" to explain
effects for which they cannot account, and which seem to them
marvellous. Such an idea of spirit is preserved only by ignorance
and sloth. It is more useful to divines, but most harmful to the
progress of society, which keeps pace with science. The immor-
tality of the soul is a religious dogma which never was of any use
except to priests, and is not even a check upon the passions if they
are at all violent, as experience sufficiently proves. And as neces-
sary laws govern all natural phenomena, intellectual and moral
phenomena included, freedom is quite out of the question.
So far this materialism had nothing remarkable about it unless
it be its perfect frankness. But on the question of the existence
of God, D'Holbach subjected deism and theism to a searching crit-
icism, obviously directed against Voltaire's natural religion, and
worthy of some notice. People make a wrong use of physics in
behalf of metaphysics, says D'Holbach, and the study of nature
should have nothing to do with moral or theological interests lest
a new chance of errors be added to all those we already have to
guard against. But even if we overlook this point, the argument
based on final causes does not prove what it is thought to prove.
First of all, the idea of order is relative to human canons of pro-
priety, and if we leave these out of account, disorder is in itself no
less natural and normal than order, nor illness than health ; all
phenomena being produced by virtue of the same laws. Then
"to be surprised that the heart, the brain, the arteries, etc., of
an animal should work as they do, or that a tree should bear fruit,
is to be surprised that an animal or a tree should exist." What
we call finality is but the total sum of the conditions required for
the existence of every being. When these conditions are found
combined, the living being subsists ; if they cease to be so, it dis-
appears; and this very simple proposition, which is true as re-
gards individuals, is no less so as regards species and even suns.
There is nothing in this which compels us to have recourse to a
Providence, the author and maintainer of the world's order.
The divine personality, upheld by theists, is untenable. New-
ton, the vast genius who divined Nature and its laws, is only a
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child when he leaves the domain of physics ; and his theology
shows that he had remained in bondage to the prejudices of his
childhood. What is that God, lord and sovereign of all things,
who rules the universe, but an anthropomorphic conception, which
was only a reminiscence of Newton's Christian education ? And
what is Voltaire's retributive and vengeful God, but a reminis-
cence of precisely the same kind ?
The God of deists is useless, that of theists is full of contra-
dictions. If we nevertheless accept him, we have no right to re-
ject anything in the name of reason, and we are inconsistent if we
refuse to go further and to submit to religious dogma. Theism is
liable to as many heresies and schisms as religion, and is, from a
logical point of view, even more untenable. So there will always
be but a step "from theism to superstition." The least derange-
ment in the machine, a slight ailment, some unforeseen affliction,
are sufficient to disturb the humors, and nothing more is required.
Natural religion is only a variety of the other kind of religion, and
speedily comes back to the original type. It is fear, and ignorance
of causes, that first suggested to man the idea of his gods. He
made them rude and fierce, then civilised, like himself; and noth-
ing but science can cause this instinctive theology to disappear.
The appearance of this book, in which the author (though
under an assumed name) so boldly carried his principles to their
utmost logical conclusions, created great commotion among the
"philosophers." Though they did not all feel indignant, they
nearly all thought it advisable to simulate indignation. Voltaire
strongly protested, and this time he was sincere. Diderot, who
was suspected of having had a hand in the work, kept very quiet.
D'Alembert confessed that the Systeme de la Nature vfd.s a "terrible
book." Frederick II., very much shocked, wrote a refutation of it.
He clearly perceived the revolutionary ideas lurking in it, and be-
came out of humor with the Encyclopaedists, who were friends and
intimates of Baron D'Holbach. As for Rousseau, he had already
broken with them long before, and had not waited for this book be-
fore opening the battle against materialism and atheism, which he
"held in abhorrence."
Nevertheless, Rousseau had contributed to the Encyclopaaiia,
in the first years of its publication ; Condillac, Turgot, Quesnay had
likewise written articles for it, and, unfortunately, other men be-
sides, who were unworthy of such neighbors. In spite of Dide-
rot's efforts there are strange incongruities in the EncyclopcTdia,
and we easily understand Voltaire's frequent indignation at the
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vapid or high-flown nonsense which Diderot was compelled to in-
sert. D'Alembert, who ceased to be associated with him in pub-
lishing the Encyclopcedia in 1757, though he went on contributing
to it, often pleads extenuating circumstances in his Letters to Vol-
taire. It was he who, in his Discours Preliminaire, gave perhaps
the best characterisation of this undertaking in which the philo-
sophical spirit of the age found its expression : "The present cen-
tury," he said, "which thinks itself destined to alter laws of all
kinds and to secure justice ..."
The philosophers proceeded to "alter the laws " with an eager-
ness, a confidence in their own reason and in their paradoxes, and
a power of self-delusion that were extraordinary. The government
they controlled existed only in imagination, and there was no check
of experience to bring them to a halt in time. The work which
they did too hastily now seems to us rather poor and out of pro-
portion to their claims ; but it does not follow that this work was
not necessary, or that they were wrong in undertaking it. On the
contrary, their impulse on the whole was generous, and for this
reason, in spite of all their failings, it proved irresistible and car-
ried away the very men who ought to have been its natural adver-
saries. Hatred of falsehood, superstition, oppression, confidence
in the progress of reason and science, belief in the power of edu-
cation and law to overcome ignorance, error and misery, which
are the sources of all our misfortunes, and lastly warm sympathy
for all that is human were shed abroad from this focus to the ends
of the civilised world. Events followed which left an indelible
mark upon history. And though a clear-sighted reaction showed
the weaknesses, inconsistencies and lapses of this philosophy, it
may well be believed that its virtue is not yet quite exhausted, and
that by laying its foundations deeper it may yet rise again with
new strength.
